First, Scotus will say:
He considers that human actions are the joint result of the causality of the human agents and God. But God is not seen as a direct cause of the human will’s acts. As the first in an essentially-ordered series of causes, God is, rather, responsible for the agent’s causality itself: so the human will acts, and it is due to God’s will that it is able to act (Marebon 289, 290).
necessitas consequentiae (necessity of the consequences): this is a hypothetical or non-absolute necessity. It is brought about by a previous contingent act. It refers to the necessity of the finite order. There is no absolute necessity that God decree what he decrees, but since he has decreed so, he is bound to fulfill it.
necessitas consequentis (necessity of the consequent): this is absolute necessity that refers to the opera ad intra.
Practical value of these distinctions: it allows the theologian to intelligently and without confusion speak of both necessary and free acts. Our acts are necessary in the sense that Providence is not subject to change. But our acts are not absolutely necessary, since God was not bound to decree such.
Francis Turretin provides six different types of “necessity,” four of which the Arminian/Romanist must affirm are compatible with freedom:
1) necessity of dependence of the creature on God;
2) [Asselt intended to list the second type of necessity, but I don’t think he did],
3) every creature is dependent on God in terms of the future per God’s foreknowledge and decree.
3a) Asselt writes, “However great the creature’s freedom may be, these acts are still necessary from this perspective, otherwise God’s foreknowledge could be false and his decree changeable.”
4) free will must go with rational necessity, for must not a free action be a rational one?
5) Free will relates to moral necessity, or that of habit. If you do an action enough, whether good or bad, it becomes a habit, making it easier to do this action. Few will deny this observation.
6) The necessity of an event or the existence of a thing. If a thing is, it is necessarily. This is an example of a necessity of the consequence. It is not an absolute necessity.
In short, freedom can be determined because freedom is not absolute (Asselt, 162-163).
Necessity of the Consequent, Consequence
The necessity of the consequent is the necessity of a proposition behind the “then” in an if…then statement. The necessity of the consequence is the consequence itself. Ie, the implicative necessity. In the implicative necessity, neither the antecedent nor the consequent needs to be necessary. Only the necessity of the implicative relation counts. Take the two propositions:
(1) If I marry Marian, then Marian is my wife.
(2) It is necessary that Marian is my wife (if I marry her).
In proposition (1) it is contingent that I marry Marian. I did not have to do so. Only the implication between the antecedent and consequent is necessary. In proposition 2 it is the result of the conditional proposition that is necessary.
Proposition 1 does not imply proposition 2. Therefore, in an argument of implicative relation of necessity, both the antecedent and consequent can be contingent and not necessary. According to the Reformed scholastics, the necessity of the consequence corresponds with absolute necessity and the necessity of the consequent with hypothetical necessity. In this distinction, the Reformed scholastics combat the charge that the divine decree destroys the contingency and freedom of the world. Therefore, necessity and contingency are compatible and not contradictory.
Most important in this distinction is that it depends on God’s will ad extra. If the decision of the divine will is directed to contingent objects ad extra, then God’s will is contingent, too. In other words, God contingently wills all that is contingent. Created reality, therefore, is the contingent manifestation of divine freedom and does not necessarily emanate from God’s essence. For if this were the case, all things would coincide fundamentally with God’s essence, and the actual world would be eternal (198-199).