This is an old review, but I thought I had already posted it. I hadn’t.
McCall begins by dispelling myths about analytic theology (hereafter AT). AT doesn’t *necessarily* entail univocal language, substance metaphysics or naivety about church history (though that probably is true about analytic philosophy–JBA).
McCall makes clear that AT doesn’t entail the following
- A univocal view of language (25). (NB: Does William Alston hold to univocity? Cf. Divine Nature and Human Language, pp. 17-117).
- AT entails natural theology (26).
- AT is naive about the history of doctrine.
- AT is apologetics for conservative theology. Depends on what we mean by “conservative.” Plantinga, for one, has advanced problems of divine simplicity; yet, it probably is true, pace the current leadership of the Society of Christian Philosophers, that analytic theologians are committed to Christian orthodoxy and ethics.
- AT relies on substance metaphysics (30ff). The battle isn’t between pre-Kantian and Kantians, but between Kantians and post-Kantians. It is possible to read Kant and remain unconvinced.
- Analytic Theology isn’t spiritually edifying.
The true gold-mine of the book is McCall’s “Case Studies” dealing with metaphysics, compatibilism, and evolution. Particularly, one gets a refreshing survey of what it means for something to have an essence (kind-essence, Individual essence, common properties, merely human, fully human) and how this pays significant dividends for Christology.
Analytic Theology and Scripture
How does the Bible control and authorize analytic statements? McCall offers an interesting model that can be applied elsewhere in theology (55ff). Let P be a primary true proposition.
RA1: The Bible contains propositions that explicitly assert P.
RA2: The Bible contains propositions that entail P.
RA3: The Bible contains propositions that that are consistent with P and suggest P.
RA4: The Bible contains propositions that that do not entail ~P, and is consistent with P (it is neutral with respect to P)
RA5: The Bible contains propositions that entail neither P nor ~P, but suggests some Q that is inconsistent with P.
RA6: The Bible contains propositions that entail ~P.
RA7: The Bible contains propositions that which assert ~P.
RA8: The Bible contains propositions that assert P and assert ~P
Individual essence (haeccity): set of properties one must have for this distinct individual. The full set of properties possessed by that person in all possible worlds in which that person exists.
Kind-essence: the full set of properties individually necessary and sufficient for inclusion in that set.
Common human properties: a property possessed by many or most humans. Most humans can have a property without its being essential.
Essential human properties: an object has a property essentially iff it has it and could not have not had it. It belongs to kind-nature.
Merely human: to exemplify only that kind-essence of humanity.
Fully human: to exemplify the kind-essence of humanity.
How does the two-minds approach account for Jesus’s being omniscient per divine yet nonomniscient per human? Thomas V. Morris suggests an asymmetrical accessing relation.
The “natures” are reified, not properties.
Every primary substance (Fido the Dog) has a secondary substance-kind (caninity) that pertains to it without which it could not exist (104).
For every primary substance x, there is only one secondary substance-kind K that pertains to x through itself and is essential to it.
Unfortunately, this rules out the incarnation, since there can’t be more than one secondary substance-kind to a primary substance.
Medieval theology modified this Aristotelianism: it is possible for a primary substance x that is essentially of a substance-kind also to possess/be/come to be of a substance kind K’ (where K is not the same as K’) contingently and non-essentially (105).
Concretists affirm a part-whole (mereological) account of the Incarnation. There
My only criticism of the book is the lack of survey on how to get started in AT (e.g., which texts to read first).